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Abstract—The session initiation protocol (SIP) is a powerful signaling protocol that controls communication on the Internet, 
establishing, maintaining, and terminating the sessions. The services that are enabled by SIP are equally applicable in the world of 
mobile and ubiquitous computing. In 2009, Tsai proposed an authenticated key agreement scheme as an enhancement to SIP. Very 
recently, Arshad et al. demonstrated that Tsai’s scheme was vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and stolen-verifier attack. 
They also pointed that Tsai’s scheme did not provide known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy. In order to overcome the 
weaknesses, Arshad et al. also proposed an improved mutual authentication scheme based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem 
for SIP and claimed that their scheme can withstand various attacks. In this paper, we do a cryptanalysis of Arshad et al.’s scheme and 
show that Arshad et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the password guessing attack. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In today's and future wired or wireless networks, multimedia service is a great importance application class. Especially, the 
next generation of wireless networks will be based on all-IP architecture. One of the most important protocols supporting 
multimedia services is the session initiation protocol (SIP) [1] . In 1999, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) proposed the 
SIP for the IP-based telephony protocol [2-7]. Because SIP is a text-based peer-to-peer protocol, it uses Internet protocols such as 
hyper text transport protocol (HTTP) and simple mail transport protocol (SMTP) [8] . When a user wants to access an SIP service, 
he/she has to perform an authentication process in order to get various services from the remote server. Therefore, the security of 
SIP is becoming more important [4],[6],[8] and the SIP authentication scheme is the most important issue for SIP. However, the 
original authentication scheme for SIP does not provide strong security because it is based on the HTTP digest authentication [2] . 
The services that are enabled by SIP are equally applicable in the world of mobile and ubiquitous computing. For example, a user 
registers his/her location with a SIP server and then the server knows if the user is available and where the user can be found. In 
addition, the location could be home, work, or mobile. Now, SIP has been defined by the 3GPP (the 3rd Generation Partnership 
Project) as a signal protocol for the third-generation communication system [9] . 
Yang et al. [10] pointed out that the procedure of the original SIP authentication scheme based on HTTP digest 
authentication is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack and the server spoofing attack. They also proposed a secure 
authentication scheme for SIP to resist the attacks. However, the computational cost of Yang et al.’s scheme is very high, making 
it unsuitable for practical applications. To improve the performance, Durlanik et al. [11] proposed an authentication scheme using 
the elliptic curve cryptography(ECC)[12, 13]. Later, Tsai [14] proposed an efficient nonce-based authentication scheme. Since all 
the communication messages are encrypted/decrypted by using one-way hash function and XOR operation, its computation cost is 
low, making it promising for low-power processors. Unfortunately, Arshad et al.[15] found Tsai’s scheme[14] was still vulnerable 
to offline password guessing attack and stolen-verifier attack while. They also demonstrated that Tsai’s scheme did not provide 
known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy[9]. To overcome the weaknesses, Arshad et al.[15] also proposed an improved 
authentication using ECC for SIP. 
In this letter, we show that Arshad et al.’s scheme may suffer from off-line password guessing attack if only one elliptic 
curve scalar multiplication is required in the generation of password verifier from password. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 gives the review of the Arshad et al.’s scheme. Section 3 discusses the cryptanalysis of Arshad et al.’s scheme. 
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 4. 
II. REVIEW OF ARSHAD ET AL.’S SCHEME FOR SIP 
In this section, we briefly review Arshad et al.’s nonce-based authentication scheme for SIP [1]. There are two phases in 
Arshad et al.’s scheme: registration and authentication. Notations used in this paper are defined as follows. 
z U : the client user; 
z S : the server; 
z D : a uniformly distributed dictionary; 
z PW : a low-entropy password of U extracted from D ; 
z SK : a high-entropy secret key of S , which is only known by the server and must be safeguarded; 
z SK : a shared common session key between U  and S ; 
z ,p n : two large prime numbers; 
z pF : a finite field; 
z E : an elliptic curve defined on finite field pF  with large order; 
z G : the group of elliptic curve points on E ; 
z P : a point on elliptic curve E  with order n ; 
z ( )h ⋅ : a secure one-way hash function; 
z ||: a string concatenation operation 
z ⊕ : a string XOR operation 
A. Registration phase 
When U  wants to register and become a new legal user, U  and S  execute the following steps over a secure channel. 
1) U  →  S : ( username , PW ) 
U  submit his username and PW  to S . S  computes two secret values ( || )HPW h username PW= and 
( || )S SHK h username K= . 
2) S  computes the password verifier SVPW HPW HK= ⊕  for U . 
3) S  stores U ’s username and VPW  in the user account database. 
B. Authentication phase 
If a legal user wants to login into S , he must type his username and PW . All steps of authentication phase, as shown in 
Fig. 1, executed as follows. 
1) U  →  S : REQUEST ( username , 1R ) 
U  computes ( || )HPW h username PW= . Then U  generates a random number *1 nr Z∈ , computes 
1 1( )R HPW r P= ⋅ ×  and sends a request message as REQUEST (username , 1R ) to S . 
2) S →U : CHALLENGE ( realm , 2R , 1h ) 
Upon receiving the request message, S  extracts HPW  from VPW  by computing ( || )S SHK h username K=  and 
SHPW VPW HK= ⊕ , where VPW  is a stored password verifier for U  in the user account database. Then, S  
computes 11 1R HPW R
−′ = × . Now, S  generates a random number *2 nr Z∈ ,  and computes 2 2R r P= × , 2 1SSK r R′= ×  
and 1 2( || )Sh h SK R= . At last, S  sends a challenge message CHALLENGE ( realm , 2R , 1h ) to U . 
3) U  →  S : RESPONSE ( username , realm , 2h ) 
Upon receiving the challenge message, U  computes 1 2USK r R= ×  and checks whether the equation 
1 2( || )Uh h SK R=  holds. If the equation does not hold, U  rejects the server challenge message. Otherwise, U  
authenticates S  and computes 2 ( || || )Uh h username realm SK= . Finally, U  sends a response message RESPONSE 
( username , realm , 2h ). 
4) Upon receiving the response message, S  computes ( || || )Sh username realm SK  and verifies whether it is equal to 
the received response 2h . If they are not equal, S  rejects the user response message. Otherwise, S  authenticates U  
and accepts the user’s login request.  
After mutual authentication between U  and S , 1 2U SSK SK SK r r P= = = ×  is used as a shared session key.  
 
Fig. 1. Authentication phase of Arshad et al.’s scheme 
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF ARSHAD ET AL.’S SCHEME FOR SIP 
Off-line password guessing attack succeeds when there is information in communications, which can be used to verify the 
correctness of the guessed passwords. In [15], Arshadet et al. claimed that their protocol can resist the off-line password guessing 
attack. However, in this section, we will show that the off-line password guessing attack, not as they claimed, is still effective in 
Arshadet et al.'s protocol. Our attack consists of two phases. 
Phase 1: 
1) The adversary A  chooses a random number *1 nr Z∈ , computes 1 1R r P= × , then impersonates U  and sends a 
request message REQUEST ( username , 1R ) to S . 
2) Upon receiving the request message, S  extracts HPW  from VPW  by computing ( || )S SHK h username K=  
and SHPW VPW HK= ⊕ , where VPW  is a stored password verifier for U  in the user account database. Then, 
S  computes 1 11 1 1R HPW R HPW r P
− −′ = × = ⋅ × . Now, S  generates a random number *2 nr Z∈ ,  and computes 
2 2R r P= × , 12 1 1 2SSK r R HPW r r P−′= × = ⋅ ⋅ ×  and 1 2( || )Sh h SK R= . At last, S  sends a challenge message 
CHALLENGE ( realm , 2R , 1h ) to the adversary A . 
Phase 2: 
The adversary A  then launches the off-line password guessing attack as follows:  
1) A  guesses a candidate passwords PW  , and computes ( || )HPW h username PW= . 
2) A  computes 
1
1 2SSK HPW r R
−= ⋅ × . 
3) A  checks whether 1h  and 2( || )Sh SK R  are equal. If 1h  and 2( || )Sh SK R  are equal, the adversary can conclude 
that U ’s password PW PW= . Otherwise, adversary repeat steps 1), 2) and 3) until the correct password is found. 
From the above description, we know the adversary can get the password. Therefore, Arshad et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the 
off-line password guessing attack. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this letter, we have shown that Arshad et al.’s authentication scheme for session initiation protocol is vulnerable to password 
guessing attack. The analysis shows Arshad et al.’s authentication scheme is not for practical application. 
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